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RESPONSE T< I A I1! Kl J 11W 1 ARGUMENT 
Poin 
THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT IS INAPPLICABLE 
TO THIS APPEAL 
The state erroneously contents that the appellant failed to comply w1th 
her obligation to marshal the evidence, i no suae > •..: >iMMJK- .U:r:>. ^ .. . s 
in l\\o rcsped'i niusl 111 i ir ,n ' • .vwable lor 
• ••- ^ < ^ - \\ the issue is one of lack of evidence. The marshaling 
requirement applies only when challenging findings of fact. See Dishinger v. 
Potter, 2001 i i A pp. 2000. Ar p id ^6 nt ni) u. the appellant had 110 
obligation to marshal evidence. 
• I 1 n i l II 
THE EXEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT 
HERE EXISTS TO AVOID A MANIFEST INJUSTICE 
I IK appellant demonstratec • ,-.U':M - : 
* r\l r- ;• iu ineffective assistance of 
counsel and that counsel should have objected to the jury instructions that 
were inconsistent with the charge in the information. Second, the ~t~+e 
entirely failed to provide any facts from which me jury could have IOUMU 
under proper instructions o ;we f M ^ ^ 
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in to custody and that llic nrnis nmihined had III lunrliorml equivalent of a 
directed. \ ei diet 
Whether exceptional circumstances or plain error, the magnitude of 
the discrepancies in the jury instructions should have been e 
ui.u uMn. In State v. Holgate, . ined 
unA. plain error for the trial court not lo 
discharge a defendant on the basis of insufficient evidence and held, 
"Section 77-17-3 states that when the evidentiary defect is apparent to the 
trial court, the court shall discharge uie defendant. It necessai 
the trial court plamh .1 1 .! hi ! . !•'• M >•' ! !.' \\A'\ .1 d l! 1, !aih f«i 
disclun^s' Ih " Idendant when the evidence is apparent to the court ." The 
court further held that "[w]hi le it is difficult for the court on appeal to dictate 
w h e n an evidentiary defect was apparent to the trial court, there is a certain 
point at which an evidentiary insufficiency is so I n m 1: m il I in id a menial 
111 il il ,"» HI 111 I 1  I lir plain 1 1 mil lm illlin III 1  ill null 11 Il I l i s eh a rn e the d e f e n d a n t . 
' v - m n l e : the case in which the state presents no evidence to support an 
essential element oi a erimin.il charge. The plain error exception would 
serve to avoid a manifest injustice in such a case," u. at ^ J 1. 
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Point III. 
THE APPELLANT ADEQUATLY BRIEFED THE COURT 
ON THE MERITS 
There is no rule or law the appellant is aware of that states how many 
pages are required or how many citations must be made before an issue is 
adequately briefed. The appellant briefed every issue she raised with proper 
citations, cited 29 cases and sufficiently linked her citations with her 
arguments. 
IV. THERE IS NOT A SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE THE 
APPELLANT HAD COMMITTED OR WAS ABOUT TO 
COMMIT ANY OFFENSE, THE ARRESTING OFFICER 
LACKED STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO TAKE THE 
APPELLANT IN TO CUSTODY AND VIOLATED 
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROHIBITIONS 
Under both Utah State Law and the Constitution an officer must have 
probable cause to take a person in to custody. The state's reliance on State v. 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), State v. Trane. 57 P.3d 1052 (Utah 
4 
2002), and State v. Pena Flores, 14 P.3d 698 (Utah App. 2000), is misplaced. 
Section 76-8-305 applies to a multitude of police-citizen encounters and 
each case must be evaluated on its own facts and circumstances. The section 
is not intended as a blanked prohibition so as to criminalize any conduct 
evincing interference where the action of the officer is not authorized by law 
I 
or is not intended as a shield for police misconduct. ! 
The foregoing cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant case. 
In all three cases the defendants were advised of the officer's intention to 
effectuate an arrest, and in all three cases the officers did have probable 
cause. In Gardiner the defendant physically interfered with an investigation 
after being informed of that intent which was based on the officers own 
observations of suspicious conduct. In Trane the defendant committed the 
act of disorderly conduct in the presence of the officers, and in Pena Flora 
the defendant verbally interfered in the investigation of known gang 
members and refused to identify himself. In the instant case the officer did 
not observe any criminal conduct or advised the appellant that she was a 
suspect. 
Deputy Barnes proceeded entirely on unreliable, unverified 
allegations and presumptions. Presumptions and conjectures are neither facts 
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nor evidence. And although the appellant provided the officer voluntarily 
with a reasonable explanation for her action, Deputy Barnes entirely 
disregarded the appellants explanation and the totality of the circumstances. 
Most of all, the appellant was totally unaware that she was the subject of a 
criminal investigation. 
Deputy Barnes testimony provides that although she characterized the 
appellant's seizure as an investigative detention, there was no actual 
investigation conducted. An investigative detention implies that the 
obtrusive act is for the purpose of investigation. Where no investigation is 
undertaken the detention cannot be considered investigatory and rises to the 
level of arrest. Significant here is also the fact that the officer not only 
forcefully extricated the appellant from her car, but forcefully placed her on 
the ground and in handcuffs. 
Warrantless arrests in Utah are authorized only in limited 
circumstances and are governed under section 77-7-2. The section provides: 
77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without a warrant, arrest a person: 
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(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any 
peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any device 
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or 
records the observations of any physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A 
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe the 
person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a 
public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another 
Person. 
Those statutory provisions require the constitutional equivalent of probable 
cause. In Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1996) where 
the defendant interfered in an arrest stemming from the officers attempt to 
enforce a warrant, the court held that based on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
there are three levels of police-citizen encounters, each requiring a different 
degree of justification under the Fourth Amendment. The first level occurs 
when an officer approaches and questions a suspect. An officer may stop and 
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question a person at any time so long as that person is not detained against 
his [or her] will. The next level is reached when an officer temporarily seizes 
a person. In order to legally effect a temporary seizure, the officer must have 
articulable [reasonable] suspicion that the suspect has or is about to commit 
a crime, and the detention must be limited in scope. The third level is arrest 
which requires probable cause for the officer to believe that a crime has been 
or is about to be committed, id. at 1006. Smoot demonstrates the court has 
recognized that the strictures of the Fourth Amendment apply where a 
defendant is charged with interference in a detention of arrest. And in Pena 
Flores supra 14 P.3d at 700 the court specifically declined to address 
whether a person could be lawfully arrested for interfering with a level one 
encounter. 
What should have been no more then a level one encounter in the 
instant case turned instead in to a full blown arrest because as the officer 
testified, the appellant "refuse [d] to cooperate with [her] request to exit the 
vehicle on her own power." 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when an officer without 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause approaches an individual, the 
individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. And any 
refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of 
8 
objective justification needed for a detention or seizure. See Terry supra 392 
U.S. 32-33, Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491,498 (1983), Florida v. Bostick, 
501 U.S. 429,437 (1991), Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,125 (2000), and 
Hibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004). 
Deputy Barnes not only lacked statutory authority to take the 
appellant in to custody, she also lacked statutory authority to use force. Utah 
law provides for the use of force as follows: 
77-7-7. Force in making arrest. 
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcible resists after being 
informed of the intention to make the arrest, the person arresting may use 
reasonable force to effect the arrest. (Emphasis added) 
Deputy Barnes used force against the appellant who never attempted to 
escape, who was being arrested although this was not verbalized and who 
never verbally or physically threatened the officer with harm. Deputy Barnes 
has no justification for her action. A person should not have to live in fear of 
victimization by those sworn to protect them from crimes as well as those 
who live around them who commit crimes. 
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V. THE JURY INSTRUCTIN WERE IMPROPER 
Importantly, the jury instructions contained parts of a crime of which 
the appellant was never charged in the information. In Cole v. Arkansas, 
333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948) the Supreme Court held that "[i]t is as much of 
a violation of due process to send an accused to prison following 
conviction of a charge on which he was never tried as it would be to 
convict him upon a charge that was never made." In Utah it is well 
settled that the state may not allege a particular mode of committing an 
offense and then convict a defendant for having committed a different 
mode of that offense. See State v. Hyams, 230 P. 349,350 (Supreme 
Court of Utah 1924). 
Although "there is no indication that the jury struggled in 
understanding any of the terms within the instructions" jurors may not 
decide legal questions nor draw conclusions of law from the facts except as 
guided by instructions of the court. See Coray v Southern Pa. Co. J 947, 185 
P. 2d 963,certioraray granted and reversed on other grounds, 335 U.S. 520 
(1949). Whether an officer was authorized to make an arrest was a question 
of law for the court and the court was required to charge the jury in specific 
10 
terms under what state of particular facts, when found, a detention or arrest 
was authorized, UCA 78-21-3. 
CONCLUSION 
It was the state's burden to prove the elements of the crime charged in 
the information and it failed to do so. The appellant was arrested based on 
presumptions, was prosecuted based on presumptions, and subsequently 
convicted by a jury required to presume what the law is. In submitting to the 
jury instructions without any guidance by the court on the legal issues and in 
including an offense not charged in the information, the jury instructions 
were tantamount to a directed verdict, in violation of the Due Process Clause. 
The appellant respectfully hereby renews her request that this 
conviction be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 1$ 4h day of January 2007 
Maria Joyce Jacobs 
Appellant pro se 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Maria J. Jacobs, hereby certify that I delivered eight copies of the 
foregoing reply brief of the appellant to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 
South State Street, 5th floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two 
copies to the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office, 111 East 
Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Maria J: Jacobs 
Appellant pro se 
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